Colloquium - Berislav Marušić: "The Ethicist and the Ontologist: On Self-Prediction in Practical Reasoning"

There can be something problematic about self-prediction in practical reasoning. For example, the smoker who reasons that, since he is likely to smoke in the future, he should not take steps to quit because they are likely to be a wasted effort, is making a mistake. But what sort of mistake is it? The Ethicist holds that the mistake is fundamentally ethical: it’s an objectionable opportunism that excuses the satisfaction of a questionable preference. Thus, the smoker who refuses to quit on the grounds that he is likely to smoke again is making an excuse for his bad habit. The Ontologist holds that the mistake is fundamentally ontological: it’s a mistake about the nature of freedom. Thus, the smoker who refuses to quit on the grounds that he is likely to smoke again treats his smoking as a mere outcome, like the drawing of a lottery; he denies his freedom.

In this talk, Marušić will examine the depth of the disagreement between the Ethicist and the Ontologist. He argues that, despite various arguments against the opposing position, they are not fundamentally inconsistent. He will then propose a way to reconcile the two positions by putting forward the Fixed-Point Thesis: mistakes about freedom are mistakes of freedom. An ontological mistake about our freedom is therein also a mistaken form of practical reasoning. This is why, despite differences in emphasis, the Ethicist and the Ontologist can in principle be reconciled.

Professor Marušić’s main research interests are in ethics, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, as well as in existentialism and the history of late modern philosophy. He received his PhD from U.C. Berkeley in 2007 and his A.B. from Harvard University in 2001. Before joining the University of Edinburgh, Prof. Marušić taught at Brandeis University for thirteen years.