Her early work focused on moral psychology. Since then, she has worked on topics including non-cognitivism, the rationality of moral motivation, the role of desire in the good life, responsibility for desire, and moral worth. She is currently completing a series of papers on the nature of emotion, arguing that emotions differ from sensory perceptions in a fundamental way: we cannot “step back” from our emotions as we can from perceptual experiences (such as a visual illusion), because experiencing an emotion already involves taking its object to provide us with reasons to endorse an evaluative construal. 

She has published "Moral Worth Beyond Right Reasons" in Oxford Studies in Metaethics (vol. 21). Another paper, called "Responsibility for Desire" is forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Desire. A paper she presented at the Chapel Hill Normativity Workshop called "Why Illusions are Bracketable, but Emotions Aren’t: Emotions as Pre-Judgmental Takings-as Reasons," is provisionally forthcoming in Philosophical Studies. She is currently working on a piece commissioned for the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society entitled "The Worth of Moral Worth."