Lesley Walker has successfully defended her dissertation, Seeing as to Thinking that: Perceptual Categorization and Social Reasoning, a chapter of which recently appeared as "Intersectionality in Perception" on early view for Philosophical Studies. Casey O'Callaghan (chair), David Kinney, Ron Mallon, Lori Markson (Psychological and Brain Sciences), and Matt McGrath formed the dissertation committee. An abstract of the dissertation is below. Congratulations, Dr. Walker!
Abstract: What we see shapes how we interact: we smile and pet dogs, sit on chairs, or stop and stare at airplanes. This happens not only with objects, but with other humans as well. Empirical research has consistently demonstrated that the perceptual categorization of individuals by race and gender leads to differences in treatment, and is often at the root of sexist and racist discrimination. However, the philosophical literature has often overlooked the precise nature of perceptual categorization and its role in social reasoning. This dissertation seeks to address this gap. I provide a unified account of how perceptual categorization shapes what we see when we look at others and how that constrains what we may come to think about them. I begin by arguing that perceptual categorization is a part of the construction of our perceptual experiences, and genuinely changes what we see, causing us to see the world in alignment with societal stereotypes. I then argue that we see people as intersectional race-gender categories, like “Black woman” or “White man,” rather than individual race or gender categories alone. Lastly, I examine how the mind goes from race and gender category representations to socially complex thoughts like, “she’s rude,” or “he’s dangerous,” arguing that applying schemas to particular perceptual experiences brings to mind additional informational content not found in the experience itself. Altogether, this project provides a detailed account of the cognitive architecture of perceptual categorization and its role in social reasoning.
